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ABSTRACT
Just like history, historiography is usually written and analyzed within one spatio-tempo-
ral setting, traditionally that of a particular nation-state. As a consequence, historiography
tends to localize explanations for historiographical developments within national contexts
and to neglect international dimensions. As long as that is the case, it is impossible to
assess the general and specific aspects of historiographical case studies. This forum, there-
fore, represents a sustained argument for comparative approaches to historiography. 
First, my introduction takes a recent study in Canadian historiography as a point of
departure in order to illustrate the problems of non-comparative historiography. These
problems point to strong arguments in favor of comparative approaches. Second, I place
comparative historiography as a genre in relation to a typology that orders theories of his-
toriography on a continuum ranging from general and philosophical to particular and
empirical. Third, I put recent debates on the “fragmentation” of historiography in a
comparative perspective. Worries among historians about this fragmentation—usually
associated with the fragmentation of the nation and the advent of multiculturalism and/or
postmodernism—are legitimate when they concern the epistemological foundations of
history as a discipline. As soon as the “fragmentation” of historiography leads to—and is
legitimated by—epistemological skepticism, a healthy pluralism has given way to an
unhealthy relativism. As comparison puts relativism in perspective by revealing its socio-
historical foundations, at the same time it creates its rational antidote.
Fourth, I summarize the contributions to this forum; all deal—directly or indirectly—
with the historiography of the Second World War. Jürgen Kocka’s “Asymmetrical
Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg” examines the so-called
“special path” of Germany’s history. Daniel Levy’s “The Future of the Past: Historio-
graphical Disputes and Competing Memories in Germany and Israel” offers a compara-
tive analysis of recent historiographical debates in Germany and Israel. Sebastian
Conrad’s “What Time is Japan? Problems of Comparative (Intercultural) Historiography”
analyzes the conceptual linkage between Japanese historiography and specific interpreta-
tions of European history. Richard Bosworth’s “Explaining ‘Auschwitz’ after the End of
History: The Case of Italy” charts in a comparative perspective the changes since 1989 in
Italian historiography concerning fascism. All four articles support the conclusion that
next to the method of historical comparison is the politics of comparison, which is hidden
in the choice of the parameters. Analyses of both method and politics are essential for an
understanding of (comparative) historiography.
1. The articles in this forum were originally presented as papers at the second European Social
Science History Conference, held in March 1998 in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Very recently J. L. Granatstein, a well-known emeritus professor from York
University in Toronto, Canada, published a small book. Although this fact in
itself was not unusual—he has published forty-five books or so—the title and the
content were: Who Killed Canadian History?2
Granatstein argues in this book that since the 1960s Canada has been heading
for disintegration because Canadians are no longer familiar with the basic facts
of their history. Canadian professors, teachers, educational theorists, and politi-
cians are to blame, although probably not in that order. Since “multicultural
mania” has become a new political and intellectual religion, to all appearances
the Canadian people have ceased to exist. Canada has gone to pieces and is frag-
menting into a multitude of regions, provinces, classes, cultural and linguistic
ethnicities, and even genders—and Canada’s historians are accomplices to this
development by dissolving national history in regional history, gender history,
and so on. Québec separatism is only the most visible symptom of Canada’s fatal
predilection for “limited identities.”3 The danger for Canada’s identity as a nation
is grave and a national disaster is imminent. “History is memory, inspiration and
commonality and a nation without memory is every bit as adrift as an amnesiac
wandering the streets. History matters, and we forget this truth at our peril. . . .
If we have no past, then surely it must follow that we have no future.” “For
incomprehensible reasons, we have not passed this knowledge on to our children
and to those who have recently arrived in Canada.”4
The situation Canadians face since Canadian history has been killed is even
more pitiful compared to other countries with which Granatstein is familiar, such
as the US and the Netherlands. In the US—which used to regard itself as a “melt-
ing pot” in contrast to Canada’s “mosaic”—leading intellectuals such as Robert
Hughes, Arthur Schlesinger, and Richard Rorty have criticized the excesses of
multiculturalism and have pleaded for a return to a healthy dose of identification
with the nation.5 With regard to the Netherlands Granatstein informs his readers
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2. J. L. Granatstein, Who Killed Canadian History? (Toronto, 1998). Cf. K. Windschuttle, The
Killing of History: How Literary Critics and Social Theorists Are Murdering Our Past (New York,
1997), which covers the whole Western world.
3. Granatstein, Who Killed Canadian History?, 72: “Limited identities were almost openly anti-
nationalist: it was not the nation that mattered, but smaller, differentiated provincial or regional soci-
eties; not Canadians as a whole, but the components of the ethnic mosaic; not Canadians as a society,
but Canadians in their social classes. Canadians formed a complex pluralist society, and in that lay our
strength. The result of this perspective, as Michael Bliss put it in 1991, was the ‘sundering’ of
Canadian history, a sundering that mirrored the fragmentation of the nation.” For a far more balanced
view on the recent state of Canadian historiography, see Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian
Historiography: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900, 2nd. ed. (Toronto,
1986), esp. 259-320.
4. Granatstein, Who Killed Canadian History?, xviii, 6. Cf. 5: “History is important because it
helps people to know themselves. It tells them who they were and who they are; it is the collective
memory of humanity that situates them in their time and place; and it provides newcomers with some
understanding of the society in which they have chosen to live. Of course, the collective memory 
undergoes constant revision, restructuring, and rewriting, but whatever its form it reveals anew to
each generation a common fund of knowledge, traditions, values, and ideas that help to explain our
existence and the mistakes and successes.”
5. Ibid., 89-92.
about his experiences in 1995 when he was in Holland for the commemorations
of the fiftieth anniversary of the German capitulation. The Dutch have not forgot-
ten their wartime history as a nation nor their liberators, the Canadian military. No
collective amnesia in the Dutch case, as far as Granatstein can tell, because “every
house was decorated in the colours of the House of Orange [the Dutch royal fam-
ily] and with Canadian flags.” “The Dutch remember. They teach their children
about the war in their schools; they teach that freedom is everything and that, if
not defended, it can be lost.”6 And all of that, of course, is in stark contrast to
Canadians, who have forgotten about their “D-Day,” “Flanders Fields” and their
“Vimy Ridge,” where—of all places!—“the Canadian nation” was born.7
For readers familiar with some of the international historiographical literature
since the 1970s—for instance on Germany or the US—Granatstein’s diagnosis
of Canada’s historiography contains several well-known elements, although
none of his arguments is based on empirical comparisons with other countries.8
First is the diagnosis of a crisis of the nation-state and the linkage of this nation-
state with the historical awareness of national identity. In the same move histori-
ography is identified as the locus of historical consciousness of the nation; there-
fore, the crisis of the nation-state is equated with a crisis of national historiogra-
phy. Second is the explanation of this crisis as an internal process of fragmenta-
tion, that is, the disintegration into parts of what used to be a whole. This
whole—the nation—is conceptualized as an essence and not as an “imagined
community.” Thus the definition of nationhood is taken for granted. In
Granatstein’s case, as we observed, Canadian nationality is essentially English-
Canadian nationality to the exclusion of French-Canadian nationality, which is
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6. Ibid., 114. Granatstein’s observations on Holland in 1995 are remarkable, to say the least. Most
Dutch historians hold quite a different view on Dutch historical consciousness before, during, and
after 1995; cf. the report on Youth and History in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, 1997).
7. Ibid., 132: “The immigrant colonials found themselves transformed into Canadians. Many vet-
erans recalled attacking at Vimy Ridge in April 1917 as soldiers of the Empire, but waking up the day
of their great victory as Canadians, full of pride at their maple leaf badges. The war mattered to
Canadians, and it gave them a sense of nationhood that has helped to define this country ever since.”
On 88, however, Granatstein had stated that “it would have been more correct to say that English-
Canadian nationalism was born on Vimy Ridge” followed by the succinct observation: “The simple,
if regrettable, truth was that French and English-speaking Canadians had differing interpretations of
the country’s past, present and future.” The past tense is obviously misplaced. See for recent French-
Canadian (Québec) perspectives on Canadian history: J.-P. Bernard, “L’historiographie canadienne
récente (1964–94) et l’histoire des peuples du Canada,” Canadian Historical Review 76 (1995), 320-
353, and G. Bouchard, Populations neuves, cultures fondatrices et conscience nationale en Amérique
latine et au Québec (Chicoutoumi, 1996).
Consistency, by the way, is not Granatstein’s most salient characteristic in this book, because apart
from his circumvention of the central issue—that is, the different definitions of Canadian nation-
hood—Canada’s birth certificate at Vimy Ridge excludes half its population: women.
8. For the US see, among others, J. Scott, “History in Crisis? The Other Side in History,” American
Historical Review 94 (1989), 680-692; A. Megill, “Fragmentation and the Future of Historiography,”
American Historical Review 96 (1991), 693-698; and D. Ross, “Grand Narrative in American
Historical Writing: From Romance to Uncertainty,” American Historical Review 100 (1995), 651-
677. For Germany, see M. Geyer and K. Jarausch, “The Future of the German Past: Transatlantic 
Reflections for the 1990s,” Central European History 22 (1989), 229-259; Sozialgeschichte, Alltags-
geschichte, Mikro-Historie: Eine Diskussion, ed. W. Schulze (Göttingen, 1994); and Kulturgeschichte
heute, ed. W. Hardtwig and H.-U. Wehler (Göttingen, 1996).
not taken seriously for one moment. No wonder even Charles Taylor’s interna-
tionally renowned Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition doesn’t even
make it to his footnotes.9 Third are the usual suspects in the murder of the uni-
tary nation: the well-known “champions of difference and alterity,” such as
social historians, ethnic historians, and gender historians. Fourth are the com-
parisons—implicit and explicit—with times and places when and where the
“wholeness” of the nation and its history were duly respected and its fragmenta-
tion resisted. These comparison-situations function as a kind of foil and as
“counter-history” to the history presented; they may have a positive, exemplary
function or a negative, critical one. In Granatstein’s gloomy analysis Canada
itself before the 1960s functions as a positive “counter-history,” together with the
Netherlands. Fifth is the presupposition that history in itself is an integrating and
uniting rather than a dispersing and divisive force. As the heir to universal histo-
ry national history too is conceptualized as a benign force or a Heilsgeschichte.
I have taken Granatstein’s recent book on Canadian historiography as a point
of departure for this forum on comparative historiography because it exemplifies
the problems of non-comparative historiography so well. By systematically omit-
ting the international context and thus by leaving the question of what is partic-
ular and general in his case aside, Granatstein highlights the prospects and
promises of comparative historiography in an indirect way. Because his analysis
sticks to the national framework, it creates the inevitable illusion that national—
in this case, Canadian—problems must have national causes. If we accept Marc
Bloch’s view that all history is comparative history—implicit or explicit—then
it is easy to see why comparative historiography is even more needed than com-
parative history: in historiography historians are confronted with comparative
judgments at two levels instead of one, as is the case in normal historical prac-
tice. In normal historical practice historians face comparative judgments in both
temporal and spatial dimensions, even when they are not recognizzed as such.
Characterizations of the US as “the first new nation” or of Imperial Germany as
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9. For Granatstein’s treatment of French-Canadian nationalism see for instance his sketch of
Québec history-teaching on 34: “To judge by the curricular materials, Canadian history is merely the
alien backdrop against which events in francophone Quebec occur. Scarcely any attempt is made to
compare life, issues, and events in Quebec with those elsewhere in Canada. If it happened in Quebec,
in other words, it’s important; if it didn’t, it’s not—unless les maudits Anglais humiliated les pauvres
Québécois yet again.”
For Taylor, see C. Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, 1992).
Characteristic of discussions on national identity seems to be the apparent unwillingness or inability
of many involved to regard the view of “the other side” as legitimate and serious. In the Canadian 
debate, for instance, in both the English-Canadian and the French-Canadian discourses on national
identity the premises of arguments are often identical to their conclusions. Authors such as
Granatstein just define the political ambitions of the Québecois as an infringement on Canadian
national identity just as Québecois such as Gérard Bouchard define the very idea of Canadian nation-
al identity as a chimera. Cf. Levy’s analysis of the debate between Zionist and post-Zionist views on
Israeli identity in part 3 of this forum, pages 50-65. 
Ramsay Cook—another famous history professor from York—has developed a far better argued
view on the problem of Canadian nationality than Granatstein, but they share the crucial presupposi-
tion that there is a national Canadian identity and that the Quebécois are causing its fragmentation. See
his Canada, Quebec and the Uses of Nationalism (Toronto, 1995), esp. 85-98, 159-196, and 237-247. 
“the belated nation” (“die verspätete Nation”) or as “the empire in the middle”
(“das Reich in der Mitte”) represent well-known paradigm cases. Because histo-
riography is the history of history writing—and thus a reconstruction of recon-
structions—we encounter the problem of comparison in historiography twice.
The historiographer is not only confronted with comparative judgments related
to the historical reconstructions themselves, but also related to the—historio-
graphical—reconstructions of those historical reconstructions. The weight of the
arguments that have been brought forward in favor of comparison in history in
general therefore count double for historiography.
Seen in this light, for historiographers there is no reason for complacency. Just
as with “normal” history, historiography is typically analyzed predominantly
within the framework of the national state and not in a comparative cross-nation-
al framework; and as with “normal” history, attempts to detach historiography
from its national context and to relate the national to cross-national contexts are
the exceptions to the rule. The simple and sorry fact is that international com-
parison of national historiographical traditions is still fairly rare.
This state of affairs is, of course, explicable from a historical and institutional
point of view. The tight historical bonds between the rise of the modern nation-
state and history as an academic discipline cannot be easily overlooked. From an
intellectual point of view, nevertheless, this state of affairs is very unsatisfacto-
ry, because just like other academic disciplines, history too is a mixture of gen-
eral (international) and specific (national) ingredients. Since comparison is the
only way to identify and explain both differences and similarities between
national historiographical traditions, the comparative approach is the logical
(though laborious) path to follow in historiography (see Kocka’s article in this
issue).10
Especially in light of striking similarities in historiographical developments in
the postwar Western world, the relationship between national and international
aspects is on the research agenda, because in our “global age” similarities in
“intellectual fields” usually are the product of intellectual transfers. As the major
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10. Cf. the argument in my review of Bosworth’s book Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima:
History Writing and the Second World War 1945–1990 in History and Theory 35 (1996), 234-252. For
recent overviews of comparative approaches in history see C. Ragin, The Comparative Method:
Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley, 1987); N. Christie, “From
Intellectual to Cultural History: The Comparative Catalyst,” in Intellectual History: New
PerspectivesS, ed. D. R. Woolf (theme issue of the Journal of History and Politics, vol. 6) (Lewiston,
N.Y., 1989), 79-100; A. van den Braembussche, “Historical Explanation and Comparative Method:
Towards a Theory of the History of Society,” History and Theory 28 (1989), 2-24; R. Grew, “On the
Current State of Comparative Studies,” in Marc Bloch aujourd’hui: Histoire comparée et sciences
sociales, ed. H. Aitma et al. (Paris, 1992), 323-334; J. Kocka, “Comparative Historical Research:
German Examples,” International Review of Social History 38 (1993), 369-379; G. M. Frederickson,
“From Exceptionalism to Variability: Recent Developments in Cross-National Comparative History,”
Journal of American History 82 (1995), 339-367; Geschichte und Vergleich: Ansätze und Ergebnisse
international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung, ed. H.-G. Haupt and J. Kocka (Frankfurt am Main,
1996); H. Jansen, “Voorwerpen van vergelijking: Op zoek naar een nieuwe vergelijkingstypologie,”
Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 110 (1997), 329-357; G. Frederickson, The Comparative Imagination:
On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements (Berkeley, 1997); H. Kaelble, Der his-
torische Vergleich: Eine Einführung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main, 1998).
intellectual and ideological currents have acquired “global” currency, their
national variants have both nationally specific and crosscultural aspects. They
often represent ideas with international currency adapted to fit local cultural and
structural circumstances, as George Frederickson recently emphasized.11
Because comparison is the only procedure to disentangle the general from the
specific in each particular national context, comparative and transfer historiogra-
phy are necessarily complementary and therefore constitute one and the same
project. Before elaborating on it I will first localize this project on the map of
recent theories of historiography.
I. TYPES OF HISTORIOGRAPHICAL THEORY
Because thinking about historiography takes on so many different forms, it may
be useful to map these forms on a continuum from particular and concrete to gen-
eral and abstract and to classify them into a few types. In this manner we can
develop a rudimentary typology in order to localize comparative historiography
with the help of more familiar coordinates.12
At the abstract pole on this continuum are the more or less pure philosophies
of historiography, such as Hayden White’s and Frank Ankersmit’s. I take it that
they don’t need to be summarized here.13 These philosophies consist of a con-
ceptual explication of what historiography essentially is about, what forms it may
take and how it develops over time. The philosophical argument is usually based
on other disciplines—in White’s case on literary theory, and in Ankersmit’s case
also on aesthetics—and is illustrated and backed up by historiographical exam-
ples. Characteristic ofthis type of philosophy of historiography is that spatio-tem-
poral considerations usually play a minor role.
Raymond Martin’s approach to philosophy of history represents the most
empirical variant of this type.14 In contrast to the other representatives of philos-
ophy of historiography, he consistently takes actual—empirical—historiograph-
ical controversies as his point of departure. Therefore he stays as close to histor-
ical practice as is possible without ceasing to be a philosopher (his interest is,
after all, philosophical and not historiographical). Martin is interested in the logic
and not in the history of historiography: he is looking for the implicit epistemo-
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11. Frederickson, “From Exceptionalism to Variability,” 600.
12. Because other typologies of historiography have been developed for different purposes, they
are not useful in this context. See for overviews: E. Schulin, “Synthesen der Historiographie-
geschichte,” in Geschichtswissenschaft vor 2000: Festschrift fuer Georg G. Iggers, zum 65.
Geburtstag, ed. K. Jarausch et al. (Hagen, 1991), 151-163, and H.-W. Blanke, “Typen und Funktionen
der Historiographiegeschichtsschreibung: Eine Bilanz und ein Forschungsprogramm,” in
Geschichtsdiskurs. Band 1: Methoden der Historiographiegeschichte, ed. W. Küttler et al. (Frankfurt
am Main, 1993), 191-212.
13. H. White, Metahistory:The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore,
1973); F. R. Ankersmit, “The Reality Effect in the Writing of History: The Dynamics of Historical
Tropology,” History and Tropology: The Rise and Fall of Metaphor (Berkeley, 1994), 125-162.
14. R. Martin, The Past within Us: An Empirical Approach to Philosophy of History (Princeton,
1989); R. Martin, “Progress in Historical Studies,” History and Theory 37 (1998), 14-40.
logical criteria used by historians when they judge competing interpretations.
These criteria—such as accuracy, comprehensiveness, and empirical justifica-
tion—according to Martin explain why the better interpretations win out in the
long run and why, as a consequence, historiography shows progress.15
At the concrete pole of the continuum lie the traditional, empirical overviews
of historiography. They usually deal with specific spatio-temporal chunks and
with specific sub-disciplines of historiography or traditions, such as the
Enlightenment historians in eighteenth-century Germany, or the history the
Annales school in twentieth-century France.16 Some kind of chronology or peri-
odization is usually the organizational principle of empirical historiography, which
is most akin to “normal,” traditional history. Correspondingly, usually little or no
theoretical reflection is contained in it.
Between the two poles of the continuum and the corresponding “pure” types
are the many hybrids of philosophy and historiography. In the neighborhood of
the philosophical pole Jörn Rüsen’s well-known theory of disciplinary matrices
may be located, because its basic conceptual apparatus is derived from philoso-
phy of science, that is, from Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm theory.17 A similar posi-
tion may be assigned to Rüsen’s recent theory about intercultural historiograph-
ical comparison, because it implicitly parallels historiography with science by
presupposing the existence of a universal, cognitive, and “progressive” dynamic
along with a practical dynamic in the direction of universal values18 (compare
Conrad’s contribution to this forum, in which he explicitly warns against the pre-
supposition of a universal dynamic or logic).
At some distance from Rüsen—further down the continuum in the direction of
the empirical pole—are Horst-Walter Blanke’s voluminous historiographical
writings, in which he has tried to implement Rüsen’s theory in German histori-
ography from the Enlightenment to the present.19
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15. Martin, The Past within Us, 14-15: “The empirical approach does not do away with the ten-
sion between scientific and humanistic approaches. Rather, it expresses this tension within the frame-
work of a new set of categories and a new research program, both of which take their point of depar-
ture from an examination of the evidential structure of actual historical interpretation.”
16. See, for instance, P. H. Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism (Berkeley,
1975), and P. Burke, The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School 1929–1989 (Cambridge,
Eng., 1990).
17. See esp. J. Rüsen, Historische Vernunft: Grundzüge einer Historik, 3 vols. (Göttingen,
1983–1989), and J. Rüsen, Essays in Metahistory (Providence, 1997). For a different view on Rüsen
see A. Megill, “Jörn Rüsen’s Theory of Historiography between Modernism and Rhetoric of Inquiry,”
History and Theory 33 (1994), 39-61.
18. J. Rüsen, “Some Theoretical Approaches to Intercultural Comparative Historiography,”
History and Theory 35 (1996), 5-23, esp. 21: “Modernization is, of course, one of the most important
perspectives of diachronic comparison. It should be concretized as an internal process of rationaliza-
tion in dealing with the past.” As Rüsen’s Aufklärungs theory of history is at the same time a theory
of cognitive and normative rationalization, this feature comes as no surprise.
19. H.-W. Blanke, Historiographiegeschichte als Historik (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt, 1991).
Somewhere in the same region of the continuum is Irmline Veit-Brause’s soci-
ological theory of historiography.20 In a number of articles she has analyzed
recent conceptualizations of the history of historiography and has proposed a the-
ory that owes as much to sociology of science—such as Pierre Bourdieu’s—as to
philosophy of science. She explicitly rejects the use of Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm
theory for historiographical purposes, because—among other things—of its sug-
gestion that the dynamics of historiography have an internal rather than external
motor. Transfer is not adequately accounted for in the Kuhnian frame, according
to her argument. While she is more concerned with the social and institutional
conditions of the “disciplining” of history, in her case too there is little use of
comparative historiographical arguments. As with Rüsen, in Veit-Brause’s theo-
ry spatio-temporal coordinates don’t play a significant role; and as Rüsen does,
she highlights the double character of historical knowledge as both Wissenschaft
and as Orientierungswissen (baptized as the disciplinary identity model and the
memory model of history).21
A similar trajectory between historiography, sociology of science, and philos-
ophy of science is traveled by Lutz Raphael in Germany, who—in contrast to
Veit-Brause—did apply his theoretical notions to a major historiographical case-
study, that is, the Annales school.22 Significantly, however, Raphael’s book also
remains within the parameters of the “one nation-approach” (in his case France)
although he draws general conclusions from the international reception of the
Annales school. One of them amounts also to a critique of Kuhn's paradigm the-
ory for historiographical purposes: according to Raphael it blacks out essential
continuities in historiographical traditions over time. Also relevant in our context
is Raphael’s conclusion that even where the Annales historians loudly pro-
pounded the transcen-dence of the nation-state in history-writing, at a subter-
ranean level their own pro-gram of “structural” history remained firmly tied to
the historical problematic of France. The remarkable opposition of a “deep,”
“structural” history to a “superficial” and événementiel political history, to name
the most obvious example, is only explicable within the French intellectual con-
text of the 1940s and 1950s.
Similar observations have recently been made regarding the postwar German
brands of “structural” history, the Strukturgeschichte and the historische Sozial-
wissenschaft. While representing international trends in historiography, these
programs at the same time are subterraneously hooked onto specific national
intellectual contexts, such as the debate on the Sonderweg in the German case.23
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20. I. Veit-Brause, “Paradigms, Schools, Traditions: Conceptualizing Shifts and Changes in the
History of Historiography,” Storia della Storiografia/Geschichte der Geschichtsschreibung 11 (1990),
50-65; I. Veit-Brause, “Historiographical Progress: Its Theory and Practice. Introductory Note,”
Storia della Storiografia/Geschichte der Geschichtsschreibung 22 (1992), 79-84; I. Veit-Brause, “The
Disciplining of History: Perspectives on a Configurational Analysis of its Disciplinary History,” in
History-Making: The Intellectual and Social Formation of a Discipline, ed. R. Torstendahl and I. Veit-
Brause (Stockholm, 1996), 7-31.
21. Veit-Brause, “The Disciplining of History.”
22. L. Raphael, Die Erben von Bloch und Febvre: Annales-Geschichtsschreibung und nouvelle his-
toire in Frankreich 1945–1980 (Stuttgart, 1994).
23. Ibid., 467-502. For Germany, see T. Welskopp, “Die Sozialgeschichte der Väter: Grenzen und
Perspek-tiven der Historischen Sozialwissenschaft,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 24 (1998), 173-198.
Halfway along the continuum are books like Telling the Truth about History
by Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, or Peter Novick’s That Noble
Dream.24 This type of approach consists of a mixture of traditional empirical his-
toriography of one nation—US historiography in both cases—and philosophy of
history proper. Therefore this hybrid genre obviously differs from plain empiri-
cal historiography, because a representation of a particular piece of historiogra-
phy basically functions as a vehicle for a philosophical argument. The historio-
graphical overview, consequently, is at the same time a defense of and an attack
on a particular philosophical position. In Novick’s case the attack is directed
against realism while relativism is defended: the blossoming of pluralism in his-
toriography since the 1960s is interpreted as an argument in favor of relativism.
In Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob’s case it is just the other way around: recent plural-
ism is interpreted as an argument in favor of (practical) realism, and relativism is
rejected as inconsistent with two basic presuppositions of history as a discipline:
the “reality-rule,” based on the facticity of the past, and the “rule of truth,” pre-
supposed in the very notion of empirical research.25 Along the way Novick and
Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob also distinguish between history as Wissenschaft and
as Orientierungswissen.
A historiographical type closer to comparative historiography is represented
by Fritz Ringer’s comparative historiography of academic cultures in France and
Germany around the turn of the last century. Although Ringer’s book Fields of
Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective resembles
what Jürgen Kocka calls “asymmetrical comparison”—because the “compar-
ison-situation” of Germany is not so much in this book as in his earlier one on
the German mandarins—it is thoroughly comparative in the structure of its argu-
ments. At the same time it is explicitly intended as an example of comparative
historiography based on sociology of science, that is, Bourdieu’s theory of “aca-
demic fields.”
Another recent position in the field of historiographical theory relevant for
comparative historiography is Ann Rigney’s communicative theory of historiog-
raphy, based on her comparative analysis of French Romantic historiography.26
Her starting point is a very basic observation: “When historians like other mor-
tals use language, they engage in a communicative activity, i.e., an activity
designed to convey coherent information about the world to someone else.
History is written to be read,”27 and, therefore, at the level of theory historio-
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graphy needs to be analyzed as a form of communication. This implies that in
history, as a communicative activity, factual information is only interesting as far
as it is relevant for a topic under consideration and as far as this topic is relevant
for our present-day concerns, that is, a present “system of relevance.”28 As there
are always multiple versions of any topic and multiple “systems of relevance”—
there is no History, only histories—factual information can only be judged in
relation to multiple texts and in relationship to the difference it makes in this con-
text of multiple texts. In this sense historiography is always intertextual and at
the same time related to “the expectations and interests of those who read it.”
Therefore, historiographical developments must be analyzed in relationship to
the “horizon of expectation” of the public addressed.29
Because “the starting point [of historiography] is not silence (by now
irretrievable), but what has been said already,” “revisionist works are intertextu-
ally linked to the alternative accounts they seek to displace.” As a consequence
of this critical drive behind much historiography, varying from critical distance
to downright antagonism, historiographical representation possesses an “agonis-
tic dimension” according to Rigney: “historians, contrary to what much theoret-
ical reflection might lead one to believe, do write regularly in the negative mode,
the assertion of what happened going hand in glove with the denial of what did
not happen, what was certainly not the case or only partially so.”30 For exactly
this reason Louis Althusser used to label all human sciences as “critical” sci-
ences. It is this “agonistic dimension” that may clarify the fact that “normal” his-
tories may contain implicit “subtext” histories that function as foil or contrast
history for the history presented (as is the case with Dutch history in Granat-
stein’s history of Canadian historiography). In the debate on the “special path” of
German history—its alleged Sonderweg—this dimension was made explicit
when David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley pointed out that the “peculiarity” of
German history depended on the implied “normality” of European history (see
Jürgen Kocka’s article in this issue). Similar remarks are in place for the alleged
exceptionalism of US history, where French history in its Tocquevillian guise
functioned as the model of “normal” European history from which American his-
tory would “deviate.”31
Still further down the continuum to the empirical pole sits Georg Iggers’s
longstanding historiographical project, which brings us closer to comparative
historiography than all the other positions reviewed so far. Here,—beginning
with his New Directions in European Historiography (1975), continued in its
revised edition (1984), and ending with his Historiography in the Twentieth
Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge (1997)—is a
truly cross-national historiography. We could attach the label “parallel cross-
national historiography” to this type of project, because it basically consists of a
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parallel analysis of national historiographies.32 With a focus on Germany, France,
Great Britain, and the United States, Iggers’s historiographical studies comprise
an international panorama of erudition informed by a modicum of Kuhnian phi-
losophy of science.
The role of Kuhn has, however, gradually dwindled to the vanishing point
between 1975 and 1997. In Iggers’s 1975 book the concept of paradigm was the
main organizing principle, for he distinguished a French Annales, a German post-
historicist, and an Anglo-Saxon Marxist paradigm in modern European histori-
ography. In his new postscript to the 1984 edition, however, he aired doubts
about this organizing idea. Now he put more emphasis on the influence of ideol-
ogy on historiographical developments and changes in perspectives. He explicit-
ly denied that these could be “understood in terms of the internal development of
the discipline of history alone” because they also reflect “the impact of the col-
lective experience of the twentieth century.” And in 1997 his conclusion is that
“all this points not to a new paradigm but to an expanded pluralism.” Iggers,
however, does not interpret this extended pluralism as an “anything goes” plu-
ralism—as some postmodernists would have it—but a pluralism that remains
within the parameters of historiographical rationality.33 Thus, as in the case of
Rüsen, Martin, and Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, Iggers’s brand of comparative his-
toriography combines a defense of realism, rationality, and a faith in historio-
graphical progress. Realism, to all appearances, seems to offer the most effective
defense against the Granatstein type of skepticism with respect to the recent state
of historiographical pluralism. 
A similar position on the continuum is occupied by Richard Bosworth’s paral-
lel cross-national historiography of the Second World War. His Explaining
Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and the Second World War
1945–1990 sketches historiographical developments related to World War II in
England, France, Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan.34 Bosworth too
has tried to structure historiographical developments with the help of Kuhn’s par-
adigm theory. Also in his case, comparison is not really built into the research
design, because national historiographies are predominantly analyzed within
national contexts. To all appearances, therefore, even in cross-national historiog-
raphy the national context is still treated as more important than the internation-
al one.
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II. THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE NATION AND COMPARATIVE HISTORIOGRAPHY
At the most general level, comparison is the only effective antidote to the “only
the lonely” complex that is still rampant in historiography. It is basically the only
methodological procedure to prevent empirically unjustified attributions of
particular (local or national) characteristics and problems of historiography to
particular (local or national) causes. Comparative designs do so by separating the
particular from the general characteristics relative to the question(s) asked.35 So,
to return to our Canadian case, a historiographical inquiry across the Canadian
borders would have taught Granatstein that the relatively disintegrated state of
historiography since the 1960s is not at all specific to Canada, but a feature of the
Western world at large.36 Although there are of course important national differ-
ences to be noticed—for instance between federal and unitary states, and
between relatively stable and unstable political systems—one of the most salient
features of Western historiography since the 1960s is the common demise of the
nation-state as the central focus and the simultaneous common rise of social, eth-
nic, gender, regional, and local identities. This change of historiographical focus
reflects a change in the dominant modes of individual and collective self-repre-
sentation in the Western world—and not just in Canada. The fragmentation of
national identity into a number of sub- and supra-national identities has surely
been the dominant trend during the last four decades, although countercurrents
cannot be overlooked—such as the case of Germany after reunification.37
Granatstein is by no means the only historian in the Western world who feels
ill at ease with the fragmented state of modern historiography. In the US the
recent foundation of the Historical Society comes to mind, but when we stick to
the Canadian example, J. Careless is the token celebrity. He had personally advo-
cated the concept of “limited identities” and historiographical pluralism back in
the 1960s, but spoke for many when he wrote in 1980 that in the meantime he
felt like a farmer in the midst of a flood when he declared: “Lord, I know I prayed
for rain but this is ridiculous.”38 The shift of interest from the problems of “sci-
entific,” “objective” history into the issues of “collective memory”—connected
to specific milieux de mémoires and thus being particular and subjective by defi-
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nition—can easily and plausibly be interpreted as a consequence (and carrier!) of
this development towards fragmentation of history and historical consciousness.
Now this fear of fragmentation is not only a matter of the psychology of indi-
vidual historians, but also a matter of the epistemology of history as such. At
stake is the fear that there is no real borderline between pluralism on the one side
and relativism (“there is no king in Israel”) and skepticism (“anything goes”) on
the other. This epistemological problem easily acquires an existential dimension
for professional historians who realize that relativism and skepticism constitute
fundamental threats to the foundation of historical business as such, that is, the
idea of professional, scientific history. Probably this is one of the main reasons
why the discussion about the “fragmentation of identities” in the human sciences
so often is not conducted sotto voce, but in overheated and hysterical overtones.
Though comparison may have many merits, it definitely is no panacea for
existential Angst nor for hysteria caused by fear of fragmentation of the nation.
Whoever is susceptible to those ills is better advised to look somewhere else for
help. Nor is comparison a guarantee against empirically false judgments, because
just like politicians, historians may try to prove anything by comparison. Ernst
Nolte in the Historikersstreit and Daniel Goldhagen in Hitler’s Willing
Executioners, among others, testify to that troublesome fact.39 Nevertheless,
when comparison is properly conducted, it accomplishes something very impor-
tant: it cuts worries and problems down to the justified, right size by rational and
empirical means. It does so by putting them in a general perspective and by “rel-
atively” assessing their factual grounds. Comparison thus puts relativism in a
context and thereby provides a critical and reflective perspective. By revealing
the sociohistorical foundations of skepticism, it at the same time creates its anti-
dote.
III. ON THIS FORUM
Although this forum consists of four articles on four different historiographical
cases, they do have a common frame of reference both in their subject matter—
the historiographical ways of dealing with the Second World War—and in their
focus on comparison.
Jürgen Kocka’s article, “Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of
the German Sonderweg,” deals with the famous debate on the presumably “spe-
cial path” of Germany’s history which has haunted historians dealing with
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Germany for several decades. Kocka analyzes the several stages the debate has
gone through and shows what parts of the Sonderweg thesis, in his view, have
survived the empirical and methodological criticisms of recent years. He
explores the historical context from which this thesis emerged, and he analyzes
the presuppositions involved, especially the problematic foil of a “normal
European/North American history” which underlies the debate. He uses the case
of the German Sonderweg to discuss the characteristics and difficulties, the risks
and the opportunities of asymmetrical comparison. Using the German case as a
point of departure he explores the logic of a variant of historical comparison fre-
quent in other areas of historical research as well.
Daniel Levy’s article, “The Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and
Competing Memories in Germany and Israel,” is directly connected to Kocka’s,
for it offers a full-blown comparative analysis of recent historiographical debates
in Germany and Israel as well as their (inter)relationship with definitions of
national identity. Levy’s article shows that the methodological device of com-
parison itself is intimately linked to “horizons of expectation” and is implicated
in broader political-cultural issues. Levy reveals how the civil and ethnic defini-
tions of German and Israeli national identity are related to different political
agendas.
Sebastian Conrad’s article, “What Time Is Japan? Problems of Comparative
(Intercultural) Historiography,” also deals with the construction of national—in
this case Japanese—identity through historiography. In a detailed analysis of
postwar Japanese historiography Conrad argues that a conceptual linkage exists
between Japanese and European historiography—interpreted as a periodization
of world history—and he shows that the latter has been functioning as a model
for the first. Postwar Japanese historiography according to Conrad remains
essentially a “derivative discourse.” Next to Kocka’s, Conrad’s article is another
neat illustration of the “agonistic dimension” in historiography (Rigney), and a
convincing analysis of the ways in which the conceptual tools of a particular his-
toriographical tradition—or of a “historiographical disourse,” to put it in
Conrad’s more up-to-date terminology—are linked to another “historiographical
discourse” which functions as its foil. The phenomenon of intertextuality in his-
toriography is thus illustrated in a concrete way.
Richard Bosworth’s article, “Explaining ‘Auschwitz’ after the End of History:
The Case of Italy,” is a continuation of his previous project in comparative his-
toriography. Although this article deals only with Italy—and therefore is an
example of “asymmetrical comparison”—Italian historiography is regularly
compared to German and French historiography. Bosworth connects “paradigm
changes” in Italian historiography to changes in identity politics—of the Italian
Left and Right, and of what is left of Left and Right since 1989. Just as Levy
does, he emphasizes the political relevance of what remains unsaid in historio-
graphical discourse—its “symptomatic silences.” By comparing the silences in
Italian and in German historiography Bosworth comes to the conclusion that
German historians have shown a far greater willingness to face the darker sides
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of their “fascist” legacy than their Italian counterparts. In this way comparative
historiography may help to redress false impressions and prejudices, for
Bosworth’s conclusion most likely also holds for German historiography com-
pared to French or Dutch historiography on World War II.
All four articles support the conclusion that next to or behind the method of
historical comparison is a politics of historical comparison, which is hidden in
the choice of the parameters. These parameters of comparison constitute the so-
called contrast class or the comparison situation, and all four articles offer fine
illustrations of how these comparison situations determine the results of the com-
parison.40 This circumstance may explain why comparisons without explicit con-
trast classes (and thus clear-cut questions) so often lead to inconclusive or even
misleading results. To translate Lenin’s political principle “Trust is good, but
control is better” to our context: “trust in comparison is good, but control over
the comparison situation is better.”
In national histories the comparison situations usually consist of the histories
of other nations—idealized or not, as illustrated by Granatstein—leading to dif-
ferent interpretations of the national history according to different comparison
situations. The Sonderweg debate as analyzed by Kocka, and Japanese histori-
ography as analyzed by Conrad, offer clear illustrations of this direct connection
between histories and their implied comparisons. Or the comparison situations
may consist of other interpretations of what it is to be the nation under study.
Bosworth’s article highlights this problem as he charts the changing representa-
tions of “the Italian people” under fascism from a collective of victims and
resisters to a variety of perpetrators, bystanders, and victims. And Levy’s article
goes into the different interpretations of what it means to be Israeli in Zionist and
post-Zionist historiography and what it means to be German in nationalistic and
post-nationalistic historiography. By deconstructing essentialist notions of
nationhood, comparative historiography may contribute to the acceptance of dif-
ference and the promotion of tolerance. There are worse things historians can do.
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